July-September 2025 Report – Tunisian Social Observatory
A marked resurgence of protest movements was observed during the third quarter of 2025, with a notable peak in September, which recorded the highest number since the beginning of the year.
A total of 1,316 social movements were recorded between July and September 2025, nearly double the number recorded during the same period in the previous two years: 752 movements in 2024 and 680 in 2023.
The relatively high number of movements recorded during the third quarter of 2025 confirms the clear return of protest as the preferred means of expression and assertion of rights. It highlights the wide gap between the expectations of citizens and social actors, the political promises made, and the reality of policies that often contradict these commitments.
This intensification of mobilization also reflects the persistence of a climate of tension and discontent that began at the start of the year. Attempts at appeasement, based on rhetoric about popular sovereignty, denunciations of alleged conspiracies or corruption, and attacks on political opponents, have failed to contain social anger or restore confidence in public institutions deemed incapable of responding to chronic social problems.
After the usual slowdown observed during the summer months, linked to the calmer pace of community life, July saw 357 protests and August 323. With 635 protests in September alone, the start of the school year and the political season marked a vigorous resumption of social unrest, making September the most turbulent month since the beginning of the year. This dynamic illustrates the return of social tensions accentuated by the economic situation, the resumption of activities, and the high expectations associated with the start of the new school year.
In September 2025, the first half of the month was marked by the launch of the Maghreb and International Resistance Flotilla, in which many Tunisian activists took part. This movement sparked widespread popular mobilization across the country in support of the Palestinian cause and in condemnation of the war of extermination waged in Gaza, illustrating the emergence of new forms of protest with an ethical and humanitarian dimension.
Tunisian society reacted vigorously at every stage of the flotilla’s journey, and during each attempt to intercept it, many regions of the country were the scene of massive demonstrations. These mobilizations brought together schoolchildren, students, activists, and citizens from all walks of life, demonstrating a broad consensus around this cause. The movement continued after the participants were kidnapped by the occupying forces and the arrest of 532 activists from 45 countries who had boarded some 50 ships that had departed from Spain, Italy, and Tunisia. Among them were 28 Tunisians, who were gradually released in early October 2025.
Domestically, the third quarter of 2025 was marked by continuing economic and social hardship, against a political backdrop that remained unchanged since July 25, 2021. The authorities continued to use laws and judicial mechanisms for repressive purposes, notably through Decree No. 54 and several articles of the Penal Code, which were used to silence critical voices. This repression no longer affects only political opponents, journalists, and lawyers, but now extends to all citizens, including students, in a political climate marked by the restriction of freedoms and the criminalization of dissent.
Job insecurity increased during the third quarter of 2025, accompanied by a growing sense of economic and social insecurity. Labor demands accounted for more than 55% of all protests observed during this period. These protests mainly focused on the activation of pending agreements, the regularization of professional status, the fight against precarious work, the delimitation of skills, the payment of salaries and allowances, the right to employment for unemployed graduates, as well as the improvement of working conditions and the strengthening of human resources.
Civil movements ranked second, accounting for about 25% of all mobilizations. Half of these were linked to the Palestinian cause, in response to the war of extermination and famine in Gaza, while the other half expressed demands related to rights and freedoms, including the release of political prisoners, the defense of women’s rights, freedom of expression, the independence of the judiciary, and the protection of trade union and political action.
Environmental protests remained a feature of the social landscape, accounting for around 10% of the movements recorded between July and September. These actions focused on defending the right to water in the face of prolonged and worsening cuts during the summer, as well as the right to a healthy environment, denouncing industrial spills, marine pollution, illegal dumping, and gas leaks, particularly from the chemical complexes in Gabès and Gafsa, which regularly cause cases of asphyxiation.
Overall, these protests reflect a clear stance taken by social actors, who hold the state fully responsible for guaranteeing quality of life and preserving a safe and healthy environment.
Other movements observed during the third quarter of 2025 mainly focused on demands relating to the provision of essential public services. The majority concerned the right to education, which was particularly prominent during September, the start of the school year, as well as the right to health, transportation, protection and security, regional development, a dignified life, and the integration of isolated areas.
From a gender perspective, the social movement was characterized by a high degree of gender diversity: of all the mobilizations recorded, 1,164 were mixed, 129 were led mainly by men, and 23 were organized by women.
The forms of protest were varied and mainly rooted in the field, accounting for more than 82% of the actions recorded. These included picket lines, sit-ins, strikes, hunger strikes, roadblocks, peaceful marches, demonstrations in front of the presidential palace, days of anger, wearing red badges, and the temporary closure of workplaces.
At the same time, around 18% of social actors opted for the digital space to express their demands or call on the authorities. These virtual forms of mobilization took the form of online appeals, petitions, public statements, and digital awareness campaigns, confirming the emergence of cyberspace as a new arena for protest action.
During the third quarter of 2025, workers and employees were the main drivers of social unrest, participating in 403 protest movements. This group, at the heart of economic dynamics, expressed its demands through forms of symbolic resistance and grassroots action, reflecting the ongoing conflict around decent work, professional recognition, and social justice.
They were followed by residents, who initiated 221 actions, then by trade unions, involved in 158 movements, and finally by activists, who organized 140 actions. Teachers and professors, for their part, led 87 mobilizations, while bus drivers participated in 72 actions. Unemployed graduates and parents of schoolchildren each organized 49 movements, and despite the summer period, students took part in 38 actions. Other professional and social groups were also active, including journalists, lawyers, farmers, doctors, students, medical service workers, sports club supporters, and athletes.
Geographically, the map of protests during the quarter showed a relatively stable and familiar pattern.
The governorate of Tunis retained its top position with 339 demonstrations, followed by Gafsa (150), Gabès (138), Nabeul (83), Kairouan (64), Bizerte (56), Kasserine (55), Sidi Bouzid (53), and Ben Arous (51).
The other movements were spread across the country, while the least affected governorates were Ariana (8 movements), Monastir (12), and Le Kef (15).
This geographical distribution illustrates the concentration of social tensions in the country’s historically protest-prone regions, while confirming the centrality of Greater Tunis as a major space for protest.
During the third quarter of 2025, nearly 54% of the demands made by social actors were addressed to the Presidency of the Government or the Presidency of the Republic, confirming the centralization of expectations and responsibilities at the top of the state. Approximately 10% of the demands were directed at the Ministry of Education, while 7.75% concerned employers. The rest of the demands were divided among various public institutions: regional administrations, the Ministries of Justice, Agriculture, and Health, the National Water Distribution Utility (SONEDE), as well as the transport sector and security and judicial authorities.
On another level, the period was marked by an alarming phenomenon of social despair. The last three months observed recorded 18 cases or attempts at suicide, distributed evenly between July, August, and September (i.e., six cases per month). Suicide is increasingly seen as a form of silent protest, an individual act of refusal and rebellion in the face of a reality that is experienced as unbearable, where the individual feels invisible and abandoned by the state and society.
The groups most vulnerable to this despair are the unemployed, women who are victims of physical, psychological, or economic violence, children, prisoners, and socially marginalized people, particularly migrants. In inland, rural, and disadvantaged areas, including within schools, suicide transcends its individual dimension to become a collective message. It reflects the gradual withdrawal of the state and society from their essential functions of support, guidance, and psychological assistance, revealing profound social distress and a breakdown in trust between citizens and institutions.
During the third quarter of 2025, eighteen people took their own lives: thirteen men and five women, including three children under the age of 18. Young people were the group most affected by self-harming behavior, while two people over the age of 60 were also among the victims.
Geographically, the Kairouan region had the highest number of suicides with six cases, followed by Gafsa (three cases) and Tunis (two cases). The other cases were spread across Le Kef, Bizerte, Jendouba, Sousse, Sfax, Medenine, and Nabeul, with one case recorded in each of these regions.
The majority of suicides were committed in private spaces: ten in homes, four in schools or institutions, three in public places, and only one in the workplace. This choice of intimate or familiar spaces reinforces the personal and silent nature of these acts, which are often carried out away from the public eye.
At the same time, violence increased significantly during the same period, reflecting the rise in tensions, anger, and social discontent that permeate the daily lives of Tunisians. These frustrations, fueled by growing social and economic inequalities, frequently turn into violence directed at others.
Cases of violence have been reported in several regions of the country, with a marked concentration in the outlying neighborhoods of Greater Tunis, where socio-economic disparities are widening. This context fosters feelings of exclusion, humiliation, revenge, and insecurity, which fuel various forms of physical, moral, verbal, sexual, economic, and symbolic violence, revealing the depth of social unrest and the climate of widespread tension
. Manifestations of violence intensified during the third quarter of 2025, in parallel with the worsening economic crisis and persistent impunity. The incidents and criminal acts reported—robberies, violent clashes, murders, thefts, domestic violence, femicides (committed by a spouse or family member), rapes, and harassment—reflect the worrying rise in tension and social insecurity.
Hate speech and violence spread on social media and in the digital space are playing an increasing role in trivializing and propagating violence. Their tolerance and normalization in public debate have made them one of the main drivers of this phenomenon today. Women, children, the elderly, and prisoners remain the groups most exposed to acts of physical, moral, or symbolic violence reported across the country.
During the period under review, eight cases of suspicious deaths or serious violence were reported in Tunisian detention centers and prisons, highlighting once again the lack of accountability and growing impunity within the security forces. Women also suffered numerous physical, sexual, and psychological assaults, both in the field and in the digital space.
Violence is particularly acute in regions where social inequality, poverty, precariousness, and marginalization are most pronounced, illustrating the direct link between social injustice and the explosion of violence.
Geographically, the map of violence remains extensive and diverse, affecting almost all regions of the country between July and September. Although the ranking of governorates in terms of violence rates varies slightly from month to month, the phenomenon retains the same structural characteristics, confirming that violence is widespread, deeply rooted, and persistent in Tunisian society.
